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                               ABSTRACT
==============================================================================
     This paper traces the new product development of Hyundai Motor
Company, Korea,  which, since its foundation in 1967, has maintained the
self reliance strategy, particularly in new product development. Business
strategy of Hyundai contrasts sharply with other auto makers in developing
countries as well as to other Korean makers.  In spite of a late entrance to
the auto business, this unique strategy has led Hyundai to becoming a market
leader in Korea and to becoming the thirteenth producer in the world- -
recording an output of over one million in 1994.  Hyundai Motor has a
aggressive plan with a goal to be within the 10 top auto makers by 2000
(Global Top-10 plan) but the process of accumulating the technological
resources the company needs is not yet well established.
    The intent of this paper is to provide readers with a basic understanding
of Hyundai's approach in new product development under internationally
oligopolistic markets and how it has accumulated technological resource
capability in relation with foreign alliances.  The research method consists
of literature reviews of published sources on firm's activities--including
company history and interviews with development and management personnel.  The
work will first overview the history and development of Hyundai, then will
produce case studies on Sonata (1988), New Grandeur (1992), Accent (1994) and
the Alpha engine (1991).
==============================================================================
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I. INTRODUCTION
The first international motor show was held by Korean Automobile
Manufacturers Association (KAMA) from 4-10 May 1995 in Seoul, Korea.  This
symbolic event exhibited new models, concept cars, and electric cars developed
during the 30 year history of the Korean Auto Industry.
The Korean economy has progressed very rapidly in the last three decades
moving from an agricultural base to an industrial base achieving the status of
having the twelfth largest GNP by 1994.  The Korean economy has been led by a
large group of business leaders (called "chaebol" in Korea) consisting of
companies like Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, Lucky Goldstar (L-G) and Ssangyong- -
most of which have gone on to extensively diversify their companies.  For
example, Hyundai and Samsung are currently operating ventures in electronics,
semi-conductor, construction, trading, machinery, automobile, shipbuilding,
finance and insurance, newspapers--to name a few--over fifty independent
firms. The auto industry also has progressed very rapidly during the last two
or three decades and Korea has become the sixth largest auto-making country
reaching a production level of 2.3 million vehicles in 1994.  Among the many
developing countries only Korea has exported an indigenous model of automobile
since World War II.
Hyundai was founded in December, 1967 making in a late entrant as
compared to Daewoo Motors, commercial vehicle maker, Kia, and Asia Motor
producing the Fiat model at that time.
5                Table 1.  Selected Information of Korean Auto Makers
============================================================================
               Hyundai        Daewoo      Kia        Aaia      Ssangyong
               Motor          Motor       Motor      Motor     Motor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foundation      1967          1955        1944       1965       1954
                                     (as bicycle maker)
Main Product   Accent          LeMans    Aspire      Festiva     Musso
               Sonata          Espero    Concord     C.V         Korando
               Elantra         Prince    Sephia                  C.V
               Avante,Grandeur Cielo     Sportage
               Marcia          C.V       C.V
               C.V
Production       1,134         340         620        51         46
 (1994) 1,000
Export            393          100         210        18          8
 (1994) 1,000
Foreign         Mitsubishi     G. M        Ford (10%), Kia's     Benz 5 %
Invol.          from 1982      from 1972   Mazda(8%)   subsidiary
                (15 %)          (50%)      Itozu (2%)  firm
                               but ended   from 1986
                               in 1992
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Remark: C.V : Commercial Vehicle ; truck and  bus
 Data: KAMA (Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association)
Hyundai Motor became the thirteenth ranked auto maker--1.1 million in
production and 400,000 cars exported to over 170 countries.  Hyundai added two
new products in 1995 and currently offers a full line of automobiles- -
including seven indigenous models--ranging from sub-compact to large
automobiles;
   Accent 1,300-1,500 cc Elantra 1,500-1800 cc
   Avante 1,500-1,800 cc Stellar 1,800-2000 cc (for taxi only),
   Sonata II  2,000 cc       Marcia  2,500 cc
   New Grandeur 2,000-3,500 cc
Production share of Hyundai rose to nearly 65% in 1985 but it maintains
about 50% levels in the 90s.  Total sales in 1994 were nearly 10 billion
(U.S.$) with 200 million (U.S.$) profit realized after taxes.  Hyundai plans
to be counted within the global top 10 (GT-10 Plan) auto makers producing over
62 million automobiles yearly (including overseas production) by the turn of
the century.
           Table 2.   Automobile Production and  Export of Hyundai 
=========================================================================
               PRODUCTION                         EXPORT
year       Hyundai    Industry    %        Hyundai     Industry     %
           (A)          (B)     (A/B)        (A)         (B)      (A/B)
----  ------------------------------   ---------------------------------
1965        -             141                 -            -
1970       4,360      282,819   15.1          -            -
1975       7,092      37,179    19.1          -            -
1980      61,239     123,135    49.7        16,244       25,252     64.3
1985     240,755     378,162    63.7       120,041      123,107     97.6
1990     676,067   1,321,630    51.2       225,393      346,491     65.1
1993     960,057   2,048,905    46.8       349,579      638,480     54.8
1994   1,134,611   2,305,772    49.2       392,959      737,807     53.3
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: KAICA. (Korea Auto Industries Cooperative Association)
        KAMA (Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association)
Note:   Hyundai was founded in Dec. 1967.
 The case of Hyundai is a good example of how, in the automobile
industry, an independent organization can successfully develop its product
using locally trained professionals and technology.  The first indigenous car
was produced in the mid 1970s and the power train (engine and transmission) in
the early 1990s.
72.  HYUNDAI'S  PHILOSOPHY IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT  (NPD)
The Road to the Technological Self-reliance
 Hyundai is a NPD leader.  While Kia Motors continued to produce a Mazda-
designed model until 1992--the Sephia--and Daewoo produced G.M. model cars
until 1991--the Espero--Hyundai began to produce a unique car in 1975.  While
Kia Motors as only produced 3 indigenous models and Daewoo only 1, Hyundai has
led the way with 7 new products.
Let's overview the government policy as it is one of the most important
macro business environments, particularly in the early stages of country
development.  In 1974, the Korean government laws for promotion of local
automobile industries encouraging the production of indigenous models.  This
led to Hyundai production the "Pony" in 1975.  By the end of the 1980s, the
government assisted again by enactment of high tariffs to protect domestic
automobile markets from advanced makers.
In addition to government assistance, Hyundai's aggressive approach to
self-reliance has also had a major influence on the rapid development of the
Korean auto industry during the past two decades.  Hyundai leadership realized
from the start if an auto-maker in a developing country wished to become an
independent producer, it would have to grow while in direct competition with
established auto makers in advanced countries.
The first strategic decision was related with Ford in the beginning.
When Toyota pulled out of Korea to enter mainland China it left G.M. to a
50:50 joint venture with Daewoo in 1972.  Hyundai, at that time in the infant
stages, was pushed desperately as it had to compete with the combination of
G.M./Daewoo. Three years of negotiation with Ford in trying to establish a
similar partnership failed--mainly because of Hyundai's insistence on being
8the managerial leader in the joint venture.  Hyundai tried to form alliances
with other advanced global auto manufacturers including Volkswagen of Germany.
Each time, by being insistent on keeping managerial control local, these
negotiations failed because it is against the policy of foreign auto makers
under "world car" strategy.  One successful agreement was with Mitsubishi in
1982 to facilitate technology import--by allowing Mitsubishi 15% equity
involvement with Hyundai maintaining managerial control--even though in direct
competition with Mitsubishi in foreign markets.
Therefore, Hyundai leadership has largely decided to "go it alone"
acquiring the necessary technology through licensing agreements.  The "Pony"
was a high risk indigenous model that Hyundai finally succeeded in producing
in 1975. Over the next ten years, the "Pony" would prove to be a smashing
success catapulting Hyundai to market leader in the 1970s and was followed by
other model developments in the 1980s and 1990s.
The second strategic decision came when the military government pushed
to merge Saehan Motors (formerly Daewoo), owned 50% by GM, with Hyundai in
1980. Instead of merging, Hyundai insisted on pursuing free access to any
market with indigenous models and products.  This negotiation failed and
Hyundai was forced to build a new plant to produce the newly developed and
extremely popular front-wheel drive car.  By persistently following their
vision of independence, Hyundai once again proved its abilities by
successfully entering the U.S. market in 1986 with the "Excel."
A third and most important factor contributing to Hyundai success has
been the development of an indigenous power train.  Auto industry specialists
knew, and as former research director of IMVP MIT once commented in the late
1980s, that "to get the design technology in power train, engine and
transmission, will be one of the last hurdles for Korean auto makers in
9becoming an independent producer in the global automobile industry."  In 1991,
after five years of hard work, Korean automobile manufacturers successfully
designed this critical component of the Korean-made automobile.  No longer
must Hyundai import a foreign-designed engine and transmission for their
indigenous automobiles.  This development has increased Hyundai and Korean
auto manufacturers' power in maneuvering effectively product/marketing
strategy.
A fourth strategic initiative is long range planning.  Hyundai will
increase production to 2.1 million vehicles per year and design and
manufacturer a new indigenous model every year to compete in the domestic and
foreign marketplace.  To accomplish this goal, Hyundai has recently built a
large research facility and international size proving ground on the west
coast of Korea at Namyang.  A commercial vehicle plant passenger car plant at
Jeonju (100,000 annual capacity) and a second passenger car plant at Asan
(300,000 annual capacity) are now under construction  far from  the large
Ulsan plant. Another large plant will be finished in the south-west by 2000 at
Yulchon (500,000 annual capacity).  Together, the annual production capacity
will increase to 2.1 million vehicles annually realizing nearly one million
net gain the current 1.3 million.
In 1993, Hyundai stopped production at the Bromont plant in Canada but
is actively globalizing production in Asia, Africa and other countries.
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                   <Table 3>   Hyundai Capacity Expansion Plans
 ===========================================================================
 location      plant    products       capacity by 2000   net gain    remark
---------    -------  --------------  ---------------      -------   --------
 South-east   Ulsan    passenger car,   1,260,000              0     current
 West         Asan     passenger car      300,000        300,000     by 1996
 West         Jeonju   C.V                100,000        100,000     by 1995
 South-west   Yulchon  passenger car      500,000        500,000     by 2000
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total                                 2,160,000        900,000
 ===========================================================================
Data :  Maeil Economic Daily,  5 August. 1994
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3.  KEY ROLE PERSONS  IN NPD
    Ju-yung Chung , 80, is founder and currently honor chairman of Hyundai
Business group.  He was born of a poor family in 1915 completed elementary
school started a vehicle maintenance business in 1940 and established Hyundai
construction company in 1950 just before the Korean war.  After the war he
successfully diversified the company business lines to over 50 firms related
to the construction business.  He preferred to establish new firms rather than
merge or acquire existing companies, therefore, nearly all of firms related to
Hyundai were created by him.  Recalling his experiences with vehicle
maintenance in the early days, he founded the Hyundai Motor Company with his
younger brother Se-yung Chung in 1967. He elected to meet global competition
head-on as he did in construction and ship-building businesses.  His
leadership has taken Hyundai into the U.S. personal computer market with its
own brand name--unlike other Korean PC makers under the OEM brand.
In 1980 the Korean military forced Hyndai to select either the auto or
power plant business--he chose the auto business saying that it was the
business he started.  An entrepreneur in the real sense, he has created the
Hyundai business group from nothing and is a top businessman in Korea.  His
recognized leadership ability led to a presidential candidacy of Korea in 1991
but he was defeated.  Immediately before the presidential election, he retired
to be an honor chairman of the Hyundai group with the management of Hyundai
Motor Company being passed to his younger brother Se-yung Chung.
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Se-Yung Chung , 67, has been president of Hyundai Motor company from
its foundation and has been chairman of Hyundai business group since  1990.
He graduated from Korea University majoring in political science and has a
master degree in political science from Miami University in Ohio, U.S.A.  He
has prior work experience at Hyundai Construction Co. and made major decisions
of Hyundai Motor company, particularly in new product design, from the very
beginning.  He made the crucial decision to develop an indigenous model in
1974 and the result was the enormously successful "Pony."  He remembers the
moment saying "Not wanting to sacrifice our independence, and struggling to
maintain our self-posture, we made the decision to build our own indigenous
automobile, literally from the ground up, only five years after Hyundai was
founded."
This posture of self-reliance has led him to enter U.S. markets through
an exclusive independent marketing channel in 1986 and he has become one of
six industrial heros selected by the New York Times in 1987 from sales of
260,000 "Excel" automobiles in the U.S.  He made the decision to build a plant
in Canada to produce the "Sonata" in 1989--the first offshore facility of a
Korean auto maker.  He has always been heavily involved in NPD as owner and
professional manager of the auto industry.
     Sung-won Chon, 62, is president of Hyundai Motor company.  He
graduated from the Military Academy of the Naval Forces in 1954 and earned his
master degree in Industrial Administration, graduate school of Korea
University in 1969.  He has served for 15 years as an officer in Korean Naval
Forces from 1954-1969. In 1969, at the foundation, he joined Hyundai Motor
company planning department. He was promoted to director in 1976, managing
director in 1978, vice-president in 1985 and president in 1990.  He has spent
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nearly all of his time at Hyundai corporate planning office (division) and
contributed to  corporate long range planning, government relations,
technology licensing, and new product development.  He has played a major role
in NPD as well as professional manager.
Chung-goo Lee , 50, vice-president on charge of research and
development, graduated from Seoul National University majoring in Automotive
Engineering and joined Hyundai in 1969.  He participated in product design
from the very first with the "Pony" project and has also studied engineering
design and product development in ITAL-DESIGN, Torino, Italy from 1973-1974.
      He has participated in nearly all product design development since then
and was project manager (PM) of "New Excel" in 1989.  He was promoted to
director of the Passenger Car Development Institute and to the head of
Technical Development Center in charge of Passenger Car Development Institute
and  Central Res. Institute (former Maebuk Res. Institute) in 1987   then to
vice-president of above Center.  Currently, he is a top manager in R&D  and as
vice-president manages research and development division of Hyundai, five
research institutes and three overseas research branches in the U.S.A., Japan,
and Germany.
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                            4.   NPD  STRATEGY
Hyundai started the auto business to assemble Ford models with technical
assistance from Ford in the late 1960s.  Then Hyundai added Mitsubishi Motor
of Japan as another source of technology particularly on small-size cars as
Japan was more competitive in this area during the 1970s.
              <Table 4>   New product Development of Hyundai Motor
                                                     ----  indigenous model
                                                     ====  foreign model
==============================================================================
    67  69  71  73   75  77  79  81  83   85  87  89  91  93  95
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-compact
 Pony                             76 ---------------------- 89
 Excel                                               85-----89
 new excel                                                  89 -----------94
 Scoupe                                                       90 -----------95
 Accent                                                                  94 --
Compact.
 cortina (F)   68======71
 new cortina (F)     71 =========76
 Mark IV  (F)                      77=======80
 Mark V   (F)                               80 ====83
 Stellar                                           83 ------------------------
Elantra                                                       90 ------------
Avante                                                                    95-
Medium
 Sonata                                                       88 -----92
 Sonata II                                                              93----
 Marcia                                                                    95-
Large
 Ford 20M (F)  69========73
 Granada  (F)                       78=================85
 Grandeur (M)                                            86==========91
 New Grandeur                                                          92-----
Engine
 foreign models(M)        75==================================================
 Alpha engine (1,500cc)                                              91-------
 Beta engine  (1,800-2,00cc)                                               95-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F : Ford  model     M : Mitsubishi model
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      Table 4  shows the new product development of Hyundai since its
foundation to the present.  After development of its first indigenous model
with assistance of Mitsubishi in 1975, Hyundai continued to develop technical
capability in new product development areas of styling, body design, chassis
layout, and then power train.  The following Table shows how Hyundai has
gradually replaced the foreign model with an indigenous one.
                  <Table 5>  Characteristics NPD of Hyundai
==============================================================================
model      Pony  Ste Excel Sonata N-Exc Scoupe Elan N-Gran So-II Acc  Mr
Avante
yr.          75   83   85   88    89     90    90    92    93    94   95   95
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
styling       1    1    1    3     3     3      3     3     3    3    3    3
Body design   1    3    3    3     3     3      3     3     3    3    3    3
Power train   1    1    1    1     1     3      1     1     1    3    2    3
Chass.layout  1    2    2    2     2     2      2     1     2    3    3    3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total         4    7    7    9     9    11      9     8     9   12   11   12
==============================================================================
Remarks:
     yr :  year of commercial production
     1  :  completely import  or licensing
     2  :  improve based on imported technology
     3  :  indigenous  development
   Data : based on Gyun Kim (1994)  and  revised based on additional interview
     Accent and Avante are the new models  with the indigenous platforms in
the small car or subcompact segment.  The platform of these two  products is
different from previous model with  deviate of  Mitsubishi's platform.  The
engine and transmission position of this Hyundai  platform is East-West
(engine: east transmission : west) type  but  Mitsubishi's model is  as
contrasting West-East type.   Hyundai needs at least two or three additional
platforms in medium and large car segment by 2000 to maneuver the product
strategy more competitively.
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                    <Table 6>   Platform   of Hyundai
 =========================================================================
  Platform            small                medium             large
                ---------------------   ----------------   --------------
  engine (cc)   1,500     1,600-1,800   1,800- 2,500       3,000 - 3,500
  ----------    -------   -----------   ----------------   --------------
                Excel       Elantra*     Sonata   Stellar*   Grandeur
                new Excel                Sonata-II*          New Grandeur*
                Scoupe                   Marcia*
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
  new base      Accent*     Avante*          ?                    ?
  platform
 =========================================================================
    * currently under production  on May 1995
      Stellar is rear wheel drive model
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4.   NPD OPERATIONS AND OUTPUTS
1) Inputs : R&D Investment and Manpower
     Hyundai established the R&D institute in 1974 and since then has
increased the R&D efforts in investment and manpower continuously, but the
total amount of Korean auto industry is relatively small in  contrast to U.S.
Japan, and European makers.  For example, R&D investment of G.M was 59.2 (100
million $ in 1992 and Hyundai 3.9 (100 million $) in 1993.  But Hyundai has a
aggressive plan to expand R&D investment to 6-7% of sales to accelerate
technology development in the late 1990s.  The R&D investment is projected to
reach to 625 million U.S $ (500 billion won) in 1995 and 1.5 billion U.S $
(1,200 billion won) in 2000. The number of R&D is 3,800 persons nearly 10% of
total employees in 1994 and the number will increase to 5,000 in 2000.
                 <Table 7>    Number of R&D persons in Hyundai
 ========================================================================
              1975    1980     1985     1990    1993     1995      2000
                                                       planned   planned
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # of
 R&D person   197     422     1,422    3,418    3,800   4,200     5,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
2)  NPD  Organization
In 1979 Hyundai established a new product development institute under
the vice president in charge of manufacturing with only 4 departments on
passenger car and commercial vehicle development and administration.  The
engine research department and design department was added in 1981 and in 1982
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in succession. But the research function expanded rapidly to develop the front
wheel drive car Excel appearing in 1985.
     In 1990 the major functions of new car development were integrated into
both the passenger car institute and central research institute and they began
to report to  general manager in charge of  R&D   but the C.V. institute
continued to report to VP on manufacturing (head of Ulsan plant) as
previously.  In 1991, four major research institutes  were operating- -
passenger car development, commercial vehicle development, central research
institute and HATCI (Hyundai America Technical Center in Ann Arbor, U.S.A.)
and they began to report a general manager on R&D decision under head of Ulsan
plant (VP on manufacturing).  HATCI was founded in 1986 to collect updated
information on advanced technology, particularly on emission regulations, in
the U.S A.  The overseas research branches extended to Chino California (1987)
and a styling studio in Los Angeles (1990).  The styling studio in L.A has
finished the styling works for concept car and sporty car,  HCD-I, HCD-II  and
HCD-III  appearing in Seoul international motor show.
                      <Table 8>   R&D Institute of Hyundai  (1991)
  ==========================================================================
passenger      C.V        Central       HATCI           Total
car Dev.Inst   Dev.Inst   Res. Inst.   in U.S.A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
job         passenger      C.V        power train
car                       new tech, CTM
location      Ulsan        Ulsan      Maebuk      Detroit U.S.A
# of person   1,658        549         902          20              3,192
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data : Company History of Hyundai Motor, 1992,  PP. 845
In 1995, Hyundai streamlined the R&D organization to established R&D
division in line with manufacturing division as there appear another plants
and research institute in west coast area.  Hyundai is no longer one site
operation company as the commercial vehicle plant in Jeonju  already started
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production in April 1995  and another passenger car plant in Asan will appear
in 1996.
     In April 1995, Hyundai finished building a new research center in
Namyang, on west coast of the Korean peninsula--a ten year, 620 million $
investment. This research wing is very near to Hyundai's second passenger car
plant in Asan currently under construction.  Asan  passenger car plant and
Namyang research institute will be another production and research center of
Hyundai Motor.   The 60km long proving ground and research facilities for
emission and safety standards of advanced markets, for example, testing for
ABS and free-ways built for NPD.
    This #2 passenger car development institute will concentrate on design,
styling and development of passenger car in cooperations with the existing #1
passenger car development institute in Ulsan and  central research institute
and  Design studio,  which is recently separated as independent institute from
passenger car development institute (Korea Economic Daily, 27 April 1995).
Hyundai has also extended overseas branches of research center in Japan and
Germany.
     This dispersion of manufacturing and research site led Hyundai to
integration of  R&D divisions to strengthen the management leadership in NDP.
The vice president on R&D is currently in charge of managing all research and
development activities on passenger car, commercial vehicle, power train and
design institute.  This new organization is expected to empower the R&D
coordinating functions, particularly on NPD, to establish product planning
department (30 persons) and R&D planning  department (25 persons)  with the
staff reporting directly to the VP on R&D.  Hyundai also extended one
existing product development team  to  two  as staff reporting  to the
director in charge of  #1 and #2  passenger car development institute.  The
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manager of this team as a  chief engineer is exclusively in charge of project
management.
                    <Table 9>  R&D organization  (1995)
                                -----------
                                V.P. on R&D
                                -----------
                                         product planning dept
                                         R&D planning dept
          -----------  ---------     --------    ---------    -------
          # 1          # 2           # 3         # 4           # 5
          passenger    passenger     C.V         Central       Design
          Dev. Inst.   Dev. Inst     Dev.Inst    Res. Inst     studio
          ----------   ---------     --------    ---------     ------
             product     product
             Dev.team    Dev.team.
 location    Ulsan       Namyang      Jeonju      Maebuk       Ulsan, Namyang
3)  Project Management
        The project management organization  in the 1980s of  Hyundai was
mixed of  functional  and project organization.  But the  increased number of
new product development  projects led  Hyundai  to be more  project oriented
and as a consequence,  in 1990  Hyundai  adjusted  the NPD organization in
order to empower the authority of PM, particularly on cost control, as it
became one of the most  important competitive edges in new product
development.  Hyundai  also assigned  the  project development team in
passenger car development institute to work exclusively on project management.
       Under this system the project management process in the early 1990s can
be summarized as following.  At the concept development process,  product
planning team of corporate planning office (division) in headquarter
undertakes coordinating function  of the product concept from multiple sources
as top management, marketing and manufacturing divisions through new product
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planning committee by regular meetings.  Then the product concept is
transferred to the product planning  department of R&D division.
      During the product engineering process, the chief engineer as a head of
product development team  usually coordinates  product engineering functions
in body styling, chassis,  trim, and electric parts.  The PM  with assistant
to him is in charge of overall coordinating functions on budget, cost and
schedule control as dual not exclusive job on NPD  and  he is  usually
selected seven months before freezing the clay model.  He usually begins a
project management job after finishing the product engineering phase.  PM,
assistant to PM, liaison engineer of each function are all part time workers
on project  except chief engineer  but  the power of chief engineer as head of
product  development team is  usually  relatively  weak but he is in charge of
project management--particularly in the product engineering process.   As a
consequence,  the project management leadership in Hyundai is dispersed and is
not so strong in comparison with Japanese auto makers, in which  PM  has
strong authority and responsibility on the  overall  NPD process.
      In 1995  Hyundai again tried to  empower the  leadership in  NPD to
stream the R&D division as aforementioned.  The #1, #2  passenger car
development institutes  are in charge  of passenger car as well as 1 ton-level
small bus development.  But  C.V development institute is in charge of the
large commercial vehicle  development separately.  Hyundai also extended one
existing  project development team  to  two in  #1 and #2  passenger car
development institute respectively. Each  chief engineer as  the head of this
team development team with 30-40 persons  usually  undertakes 3-4 projects
including  minor changes projects  but one distinctive  new product.  6
projects are under the management of these  two chief engineers  as of  April
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1995.  As a consequence, the chief engineer  has  more projects to manage in
addition to one distinctive new product development project.
       There are about 2,500 people in #1, #2 passenger car development
institute and design studio  for these projects.  In addition,  Hyundai has a
central research institute located at Maebuk-ri, 30 KM south to Seoul.  This
has about 1200 additional people on power train and advanced research.
Commercial vehicle development institute has additional 700 people separately.
Other Korean  auto makers  recently reformed the NPD organization to empower
the project leadership for example, one maker transformed the functional
organization to project oriented matrix  organization in 1994 and another
maker introduced leading PM. system in 1995 to strengthen the leadership in
NPD.
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                   <Table 10>   NPD Organization (1995)
            ================================     ==========     ===========
                 product engineering Div.         process        material
                (Passenger car dev. inst.)        eng. Div.      supply Div.
            --------------------------------     ---------      ----------
            product    body chas. Trim  elec.                   part dev.
            dev. team                                             dev.
            --------- ----- ----  ----  -----    ----------     ---------
                        FM    FM   FM    FM          FM              FM
Project I
   PM       chief       L     L     L     L           L               L
            engineer*
      A     (team 1)
project II
  PM        chief       L     L     L     L           L               L
            engineer
      A     (team 2)
project III
  PM        chief       L     L     L     L           L               L
            engineer*
      A     (team 1)
           ------------------------------------------------------------------
     PM : project manager   (part time)
     FM : functional manger
     Chief engineer :  on a specific NPD project  (full time)
     A  :  assistant to PM   (part time)
     L  :  liaison  engineer working level (part time)
     Project I, II                 : project of distinctive new product
     Project III  IV,   ,   ,     : project for  major or minor change
      The NPD organization of Hyundai  in  the  early 1990s  designed to meet
a demanding commercial production time schedule.  Occasionally, the project
manager will come from the senior level (for example,  managing director of
manufacturing/process engineering functions). The major objective of this
system is to work fast enough to meet the target commercial production time.
As a consequence, Hyundai, due to time compression, must, at the expense of
quality design and design for  manufacturability  to meet the demand explosion
in domestic market.  Prof. Fujimoto  at Tokyo university once  commented
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during the Korean plant visit  on July 1994 that the Japanese faced a similar
situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s; auto makers were eager to
increase the number of new products by compressing the product development
time to 2 years in order to meet the demand explosion in domestic markets..
Most Korean auto makers are in the beginning stage of develop new
platform and the success or failure of a new product fundamentally impacts
overall corporate performance.  As a consequence CEO and top management always
pay a great attention to NPD process.  They sometimes interfere in NDP process
regardless authority of formal project manager.  For example, a CEO ordered a
revision of the finished styling design at the later stage and leading to a
three month delay of commercial production.  This may be one of the reasons
that the power of PM is relatively weak formally or informally in Korea.
4)  Corporate Culture
The corporate culture of Hyundai business group influenced the managers
of Hyundai Motor to have relatively superior ability in project management.
Hyundai business group is based on construction company policy and the most
important job in construction business is project management--meeting the
project completion time.  Several senior managers including CEO of Hyundai
Motor company have prior experiences in Hyundai Construction company.  The
corporate culture of Hyundai demands superior capability in time scheduling
and flexibility to adapt to unexpected events.  The time compression is well
known as one of the most important competitive weapons of Korean business- -
particularly in the construction business in Middle East countries during the
1970s.  Korean growth in economy is sometimes termed "time compressed growth."
A manager of Hyundai Motor, in charge of new product development for 15
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years with experience of assistant to PM of New Grandeur and at HATCI, and I
agreed, during an interview, that the corporate culture based on construction
business seems to be diffused to NPD process of Hyundai Motor.  But he is
optimistic to the future of Hyundai Motor in NPD as it has shown to be highly
flexible in adapting to new environments so far.
5)  NPD Outputs
The number of new product with different wheel base introduced was only
one in the 1970s but increased to three in 1980s and then to five in 1995 as
shown in the following table.  Hyundai NPD was under a heavy load as it
developed Accent in 1994, Avante and Marcia in 1995--three new products in two
years.  This proves the capability of Hyundai NPD to develop multiple projects
simultaneously, and Hyundai's models have met with success following
production quantity in the markets per model in 1994 ; Elantra (262,157),
Sonata (235,344), Accent (187,021) and Excel (126,298).
          <Table 11>    New  Product Introduction by Hyundai
    ===================================================================
                       1970s         1980s         1990s
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
    new product        Pony         Stellar      Elantra, New Grandeur
                                    Excel        Sonata-II, Accent
Sonata  Avante, (Marcia)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
     Remarks:   Marcia has same wheel base as the Sonata-II.
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I tried to extended Nobeoka's definition to check change point from 3
point (0,1,2) grading to 4 point (0,1,2,3) grading system and add the changes
in the body suitable to Korean situation as most of new product are closely
related with foreign models in the initial stage.   The following Table shows
the changes and product development type based on the published data and
additional in-depth interview.
                   <Table 12>   New Product Development Type
========================================================================
                                       Change Point            Strategy.
                                 ----------------------------   Type
  Model Name  year  Base         fl. panel susp.  Body  total
-------------------------       --------  -----  ----  ----    --------
Sub-compact
  Pony         76    Lancer (M)      2      2      2     6         1
  Pony-II      82    Pony            1      0      1     2         4
  Excel        85    new             2      2      2     6         1
  new Excel    89    Excel           0      0      1     1         3
  Scoupe       90    New Excel       0      0      2     2         2
  Accent       94    new             3      3      3     9         1
Compact.
  cortina      68    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  new cortina  71    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  Mark IV      77    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  Mark V       80    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  Stellar      83    Mark V          0      2      2     4         1
  Elantra      90    new             2      2      2     6         1
  Avante       95    new             3      3      3     9         1
Medium
  Sonata       88    Grandeur(M)     2      2      2     6         1
  Sonata-II    93    new             3      1      3     7         1
  Marcia       95    Sonata-II       1      1      1     3         2
Large
  Ford 20M     69    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  Granada      78    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  Grandeur     86    Foreign         0      0      0     0         0
  New Grabdeur 92    new             3      1      3     7         1
=========================================================================
   Remarks :  M ; Mitsubishi
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change point
   floor panel
    0   same. both wheel and track are unchanged
    1   partially new. either wheel base or track are new
    2   new--Both wheelbase and track are new
    3   totally new, indigenous platform different from previous foreign one
  Suspension system and Body
    0  same as previous model
    1  partially new
    2  new
    3  totally different from the previous foreign model
  Type of inter-project  strategy
    0  : simple assembly of foreign model
    1  : new design
    2  : rapid design transfer
    3  : sequential design
    4  : design modification
     We can find only 2 examples of rapid design transfer case (Scoupe and
Marcia)  among 20 new product development for 1967-1995  as Hyundai has just
begun to develop its own base platform.   Most of new product were developed
by simple assembly of foreign model in 1960 and 1970s but  by new design in
1980s and 1990s.  Nobeoka found that the rapid design transfer is the most
efficient way of new product development.
               <Table  13>   Type of inter-project strategy
    ===========================================================
    inter-project strategy                    number       %
                                            of project
    ----------------------------------      ----------  -------
    simple assembly of foreign model           7         35
    new design                                 9         45
    rapid  design transfer                     2         10
    sequential design                          1          5
    design modification                        1          5
   ------------------------------------------------------------
    Total                                     20        100
   -----------------------------------------------------------
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     An in-depth interview with the expert in new product development of
Hyundai confirmed this fact that the rapid design transfer (for example,
Scoupe 1990 after New Excel and Marcia 1995 after Sonata-II 1993)  saved about
a third the time in engineering man-hours.  Hyundai is now under development
of Avante wagon ('Nextone') by rapid design transfer and it is expected to
reduce to about 30% total engineering man-hours. This fact might confirm the
research findings of Nobeoka and it also implies that Korean auto maker will
be able to reduce the development lead time by rapid design transfer.  But the
number of basic platform of Hyundai is 4 while G.M 13, Ford 12.   This implies
that Korean auto makers need to wait to take advantage of carry over effect of
common part and rapid design transfer strategy in new product development
until they extend the number of indigenous platform.
6)   NPD Performance: International Bench Marking
New product development performance in auto industry: 1990s updated
study (Ellison, Clark, Fujimoto and Young-suk Hyun) included three Korean new
products developed in the early 1990s.  one product for Hyundai, Kia and
Daewoo motor respectively  but this research did not include the new products
appearing in the following case study.   Let us overview of the results for
international bench-marking.  The lead time of 54.5 months and 2.1 million of
engineering man-hours of Korean auto makers is very similar to Japan and U.S.A
but the new product quality is below of theirs.  Korean auto makers seems to
achieve the development efficiency at the expense of quality of new product.
Ellison et. al (1995) explained it that Korean makers lack  a large base of
engineering talent and as it is only beginning to develop in-house
capabilities in new product development.  The degree of innovation of Korean
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new products measured by new components ratio is highest, common part ratio is
lowest and the scope of engineering works done by maker is the highest as the
low technological capability of parts supplier.  This implies that it is the
difficult hurdle for Korean auto maker to compete with established advance
makers.  This Table also shows that the power for project manager in Korean
auto makers is relatively weak as for the project management structure as
similar to Hyundai organization.
   <Table 14>   New product development performance in auto
    industry: the 1990s update  (adjustment)
 ==========================================================================
                            Japan      U.S       Europe     Korea   Average
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  engineering MH            2,093      2,297     2,777     2,127    2,438
       (1,000 hour)
  lead time (months)         54.4      51.6      56.1       54.5    54.7
  overall quality              62        42        59         21      52
  degree of innovation       2.35      2.20      2.35       2.52    2.34
     (4 point scale)
  process change             2.15      2.48      2.39       2.27    2.32
    (4 point scale)
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  common part ratio (%)        28       25         32        13       28
  supplier proprietary          6       12         12        13       10
  black box part               55       30         24        36       35
  detailed control part        39       58         64        51       55
  scope                        48       64         64        68       63
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 project management structure
   overall integration index  18.9     19.2      17.7      13.3      17.8
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  scope : function of engineering effort done by makers
  Data : Ellison, Clark, Fujimoto and Young-suk Hyun,  "New product
development Performance in Auto Industry : 1990s updated"  Harvard Business
School,  Working Paper, 1995.
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5.   BRIEF  PROJECT HISTORY
Case I :   SONATA   (1988)
Sonata was suggested as a next model of Stellar immediately after the
appearance of Stellar in 1983.  Initially, Hyundai planned "Sonata" as a rear
wheel drive model and negotiated a contract to import styling from ITAL DESIGN
for 720 thousands US dollar in March 1984.  But Hyundai began to realize the
importance of mid-sized car in export market particularly in North America in
the late 1980s.  In 1985, one year after styling job order to Ital Design,
Hyundai changed basic product concept to front wheel drive as it might be to
be competitive in export market.
At the planning stage it targeted 35 year old college graduated person
with 35,000 US $ annual income.  The target price was 8,800 US $, with 2,000 -
2,400 engine displacement, one hundred horse power and a 5-speed manual
transmission or 4-speed automatic transmission.  Design targets was Toyota
Camry, Honda Accord and Mazda-626, which were the popular models in American
markets but the Grandeur under production form 1986 was actually preferred in
design process as a "less bulky, more roomy" car.
In August 1986 when the project was under die manufacturing works after
finishing the basic design, the basic dimension of the product was changed to
meet the export markets in overall length from 4,732 m/m to 4,680 m/m and
overall height from 1,421 to 1,411 m/m.  This led to much confusion to project
management but Hyundai proved that it could absorb these difficulties.
Hyundai met such trial and error processes because of few prior experiences in
new product development at the early stage but these might be regarded as a
learning process to accumulate technological capabilities.  The experiences
31
developing Pony (1976), Pony-II (1982), Stellar (1983) and Excel (1985)
enabled Hyundai to work out styling features independently though Hyundai
referred Ital Design's output for rear wheel drive.  The styling experience
Sonata enabled Hyundai to be more active in styling work in other projects.
The  project manager of Sonata came from manufacturing/ process
engineering divisions.  The target time to finish styling was Feb. 1986 but
Hyundai could finish it by November 1985, three months ahead of planed time as
thanks to the CAD as Hyundai began to use CAM and computer simulation from
Sonata styling job. Hyundai spent nearly 17 months, one million Km driving for
testing this new model particularly for export market.  Xenoy, new material,
developed by General Electric was used as Sonata's bumper for the first time
in the world automobile industry (Company History of Hyundai Motor, 1992, PP.
644). A prototype car appeared in April 1986 and two years after Hyundai began
commercial production (June 1988).  Costs and time range up to 375 million U.S
$, and 67 months from the initial product concept and 38 months after
restyling for front  drive car in April 1985.
                 <Table 15>    Sonata  Development  Schedule
  ===========================================================================
                        83        84        85       86       87       88
   --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    concept  dev     11/83  ------------------->5/85
    concept change                            4/85
    (to front drive)
    styling                                   4/85-->11/85
    engineering                                       12/85-->12/86
     product and process
    pilot production                                        10/86 ---> 10/87
    test                                                        2/87 --->2/88
    #1 production
          domestic                                                        6/88
          export                                                          8/88
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Data : Hyundai Motor Company History, 1992. PP.642
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      The #1 production for domestic and export market began on 1 June 1988
and 1 August 1988, 40 and 80 days ahead of initial planned time. Sonata became
best seller in domestic market in mid-sized segment for the long time and it
began to be exported to U.S market from November 1988 to add export product
with existing Excel.  This model was also in production on July 1989 in North
American plant at Bromont, Canada, the first transplant of Korea's auto
industry but the sales performance in U.S market was below expectation as this
segment is the most competitive in U.S market.  The New car initial quality of
Sonata was 224 and 249 (number of defects per 100 cars), which was far below
that of the average of 133 and 124 in 1991 and 1992 respectively.  Hyundai
developed a completely new model, Sonata-II in 1993 to replace Sonata.
            <Table  16>   Specification of Medium and Large car
 =============================================================================
  model            Sonata     Sonata-II         Grandeur      New Grandeur
----------------  --------   ----------       -------------  -------------
 Dev. year           1988        1993              1986           1992
 engine
 displacement(cc) 1,800, 2,000  1,800, 2,000    2,400-3,000    2,400-3,000
 wheel base (mm)    2,469         2,700            2,735          2,745
 track      (mm)
       front        1,455         1,515            1,455          1,545
       rear         1,440         1,505            1,405          1,550
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Case II .    NEW  GRANDEUR (1992)
Product Development Alliance  with  Mitsubishi
     After developing Sonata in 1988  Hyundai established to develop another
indigenous model in large car segment independently  but Mitsubishi requested
to develop a large car. and finally in July, 1985, Hyundai and Mitusubishi
agreed to develop large sized passenger car with front wheel drive.
New Grandeur is the product of joint development of Hyundai with
Mitsubishi.  The major development work of Grandeur was done by Mitsubishi but
the development process of New-Grandeur contrasts the Grandeur developed by
Mitsubishi exclusively.  All development activities from concept development
to pilot production were carried out in Korea and Japan as jointly by Hyundai
and Mitsubishi.  Hyundai was responsible for body, trim design and
Mitusbishi's for power train.
During the development process, the verbal product concept (key words
describing planned vehicle) were created by senior manager, CEO.  The product
concept approved first and styling developed given concept.  Layout was
determined first then styling was selected to the given layout.  As for the
engine, it was selected first and styling was determined by the given engine
as New Grandeur is designed to use Mitsubishi designed-Sigma engine.  Design
targets of this model was Toyota Lexus, Nissan Infiniti, Benz S class and BMW
7 series. The styling work done by Hyundai independently but this model used
Mitsubishi's chassis and Mitsubishi supplied necessary technological
information on chassis and engine.
The newly designed parts of New Grandeur were about 90% which is far
above of Japanese (72%), U.S (75%), and European (68%) cases in 1990s (Ellison
et al 1995) as New Grandeur is first model of Hyundai in large sized segment.
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As for the involvement of suppliers in NDP, 25% of supplier proprietary parts,
35% of black box parts, and 40% of detailed controlled parts were used in new
Grandeur development.
    The project manager of new Grandeur came from passenger development
institute in product engineering function with following background: 48 years
old with 23 years work experience and an engineering background.  He has 11
years experience on 1 completely new product, 5 new products developed based
on platform and 3 facelifts.  The PM reports that he had relatively weak
influence particularly on marketing research, finance, basic research and
supplier relations  but strong influence on engineering related activities
such as styling, body, chassis engineering and testing.  As a consequence, he
allocated  50 % of his time on development work in design  and prototype
evaluation.  It takes 42 months and 200 million $ development budget as the
following schedule shows.
                   <Table 17>   New Grandeur  Development Schedule
    ==========================================================================
                             89           90           91            92
   __________________________________________________________________________
    concept development      2/89 --> 8/89
    advanced engineering                        10/90 --------> 6/91
    product  engineering               12/89 ------------> 1/91
    process engineering                         6/90 ------------>10/91
    pilot  production                                           10/91---> 8/92
    #1 production                                                         9/92
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Particularly for Hyundai the simultaneous engineering in NDP is  active
contrasting to other  Korean makers as  the development schedule of New
Grandeur shows that 7 months overlap (simultaneous engineering) between
product engineering and process engineering job among 33 months of cumulative
lead time in these two functions.
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When Hyundai developed Excel in the early of 1980s, the engineering
staff of Mitsubishi were very reluctant to show an engineering design and
blueprint as that provided technology to develop first front wheel drive car
in Korea and Hyundai was in inferior bargaining power to share the
technological information.  But in development of New Grandeur in 1990s, the
role and contribution of Hyundai increased drastically as partner.  After
finishing this project successfully, Hyundai as similar bargaining power in
technological problem solving.  Ten years has changed Hyundai from technology
receiver from Mitsubishi to technological partner in new product development.
The top manager of Mitsubishi began to admit the capability of Hyundai in
styling after Hyundai succeeded in the styling of the New Grandeur. Hyundai
proved it could gain experience of developing large sized-car through the
cooperative spirit of foreign alliance. Hyundai's experience in New Grandeur
development  was transferred to Sonata appeared one year later in 1993. This
might be called the advantage of rapid of design transfer not in development
time but in product quality and resource capability building in NPD, which is
more important  to current Korean automobile industry.
Case II I .     ACCENT  (1994 )
Excel was the first model exported to US market in 1986 and became a hot
seller to sell over 260 thousand in 1987, 1988 but sales fell to 10 thousand
in 1990 because of relatively low quality.  The mass production of Excel
enabled Hyundai to take advantage of the economies of scale but Hyundai began
to recognize the importance of quality--particularly in export markets.
Hyundai planned to develop another model to replace it.  Hyundai used
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the Japanese Mitsubishi platform in Excel but developed  a completely new
platform in Accent equipped with the alpha engine.
               <Table 18>   Specifications of Small Car
     ===========================================================
          model                Excel                Accent
     -----------------       ----------------     --------------
     Dev. year                 1985                1994
     Engine                   Mitsubishi           Hyundai alpha
     displacement (cc)        1,300, 1,500         1,500 DODC
     wheel base (mm)          2,380                2,400
     tack   (mm)
          front               1,375                1,420
          rear                1,340                1,410
     Chassis                 Mitsubishi            Hyundai
     Platform  type          West-East             East-West
    ------------------------------------------------------------
     Remarks:  Platform type : engine and transmission location
     Data :  Hyundai Motor Company
Hyundai slightly changed the project management system to empower the
project manager additional cost control in Accent development.  The plant PM
for Accent project came from the product engineering division.  The authority
of PM increased particularly in product engineering functions and it could
contribute to improve the product quality from the product design stage.  The
experience of Excel in export market is reflected in the development of Accent
particularly on quality as this small car is equipped with ABS and air bag as
option.  The process of developing Accent took 52 months, 430 million U.S $ to
develop Accent. The sales performance of Accent is good enough to be a best
seller in small car segment in domestic market to produce 187,021 in 1994.
The foreign newspapers recently reported that the quality of Accent has been
improved much and Hyundai is now waiting for the favorable consumer reputation
in export market.
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Case IV  :  ALPHA  ENGINE   (1991)
Hyundai succeeded to develop its own models of engine and transmission
as the first case in developing country and sixteenth case in the world in
1991 after 5.5 years of R&D.  The technology mastery of power train might be
regarded as one of the most difficulty hurdles to be an independent auto
making company. In September 1983, Hyundai planned to develop indigenous model
power train and established engine development team in Seoul and this team
moved to Mabuk-ri, about 40 Km south to Seoul, a separate research center, in
November, 1984, with 98 persons.  The number of persons in this central
research institute reached to 252 in end of 1986, 442 in 1988 and increased to
902 in 1991 including 14 Ph.Ds and 171 masters.
Strong support of top management of Hyundai led to the successful
development of an 1,500cc alpha engine in 1991 and a  1,800 - 2,000cc beta
engine in 1995.  The other projects to develop other size engines are now on -
going. Se-yung Chung, CEO of Hyundai Motor has supported this project
continuously and consistently regardless of financial performance Hyundai
Motor as owner and professional manager.  It is very similar logic applied to
the recent success of Korea in the semi-conductor industry.
At the concept development stage for an engine in 1984, some engineering
staff-persons insisted on developing a carburetor-type engine with
consideration of the technological capability of Hyundai but others argued to
develop an advanced injection type engine.  There were two demands on these
alternatives-- fuel economy and engine performance (speed) as the corporate
planning department demanded high performance but export marketing department
requested fuel economy.  Top management, however, finally made aggressive
decision to take a risk by selecting fuel injection type, high performance
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engine to show the technological capability of Hyundai.  This was a high risk
as there was no prior experience to develop 12 valve  engine (3 valve per
cylinder) with turbo charger in the world automobile industry.  The chairman
of Mitsubishi, Kubo, commented on this decision, "I don't know why Hyundai
tries to develop engine as Mitsubishi Is always ready to fully assist Hyundai
as partner and anyhow if Hyundai could succeed in engine development it might
be limited to only low level"
                <Table 19>    Alpha engine development schedule
==============================================================================
83     84     85     86    87    88     89    90    91
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
concept development  9/83 ->  6/84
 product engineering          7/84 -->8/85
 pilot product                        4/85-->10/85
 engine test                                 10/85 --->12/87
 vehicle test                                        7/87 --------->12/89
 prod. preparation                                         7/88---------> 3/91
#1 Production                                                            3/91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Data : Korea Productivity  Center, Case, "Hyundai Motor Company, Alpha Engine
Development"
        Hyundai Motor Company, Company History of Hyundai Motor, 1992   PP.340
Hyundai has imported technologies from Ricardo Engineering in 1970 for
the noise control in diesel engine.  Hyundai also tried to convert gasoline
engine to diesel to meet the high gasoline price in 1980 because of second oil
crisis with imported technologies from ElKo company in Germany.  Hyundai could
not meet success in this attempt but the engineers on charge of this project
have accumulated important technological capabilities to develop a Hyundai -
designed engine in 1990s. Hyundai made a contract to import the necessary
technology to develop 1,500 cc gasoline engine with Ricardo Engineering, U.K.
on June 1984.
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           <Table 20>  Technology import for power train development
                             ( 78 1.1 - 92. 12. 31)
==============================================================================
No.    date       tech. supplier   period          technology
--   ---------  ------------------- ---   -----------------------------------
1    78  5.19     Ricardo            3     engine design (diesel engine
2    78  6.14     Ricardo            2     engine design  noise control)
3    78  7.13     Ricardo            2     engine design
4    80  3.10     Elko               1.5   convert gas. -> diesel engine
5    84  7.25     Ricardo            3.4   alpha  engine  dev.
6    84 10.22     Mr. Daeun Lee      5     CAD for diesel engine dev
7    85  7.25     Mr. C Mears        3     alpha engine dev.
8.   85  9.20     Ricardo            1     saturn engine(mid sized engine)
9    85 10.16     AVL                1     cirius engine improvement
10   87  6.30     AVL                3     Gamma (2,400 cc) engine dev.
11   87  9.24     Ricardo            2     alpha engine 2nd
12   88  2.26     Mr. J.W Holdman    1     T/M dev.
13   88  4.11     Mitsubishi         2     E-W type auto T/M  production
14   88 12.24     AVL               3.4    Delta engine(3,000cc DOHC) dev.
15.  89  7.26     Mr. C.H. Suh      3.4    employment, advisor for T/M dev.
16.  89  7.26     Mr. Fukushima     3.4    employment, gear for T/M
17.  90 12.27     AVL               4.5    Jetta engine (small diesel)  dev.
18   91  1.16     F.F.D             5      automatic T/M
19   91  2. 5     F.F.D             5      4 wheel drive T/M
==============================================================================
Data : K Kim, 1994, Ph.D dissertation, Seoul National University and Hyundai
Motor company
Hyundai has imported technologies from multiple sources since 1970s to
maintain the bargain power in the selection of foreign technology.  The
managerial independence strategy enabled Hyundai to maintain this policy
giving Hyundai a more favorable condition in technology transfer and
competitive price. Furthermore, it could prevent technological dependency on a
specific source. For example, Hyundai imported engine design technologies from
dual sources; Ricardo and AVL as shown in the Table 20.  As another example,
as for the engine management system, Hyundai tried to acquire technology from
the dual sources Bosch and Bendix by competitive bargaining but in the initial
bargain process, Bosch was very reluctant to transfer technologies of EMS to
Hyundai under the circumstances, Hyundai invited Bendix to the competition and
it finally led Bosch to transfer favorably.  Bosch supplied necessary
specifications and technology to accommodate its EMS to Hyundai alpha engine,
40
which was invaluable to Hyundai (Gyun Kim, 1994).  It is consistent strategy
of Hyundai to acquire necessary technologies from the multiple sources on
competitive bargaining process.
The choice of appropriating technology  on good terms has been regarded
as one of the most essential elements for developing countries to develop an
indigenous technology.  In the early of 1980s, Hyundai's technologies could
hardly follow the state of art of advanced engine technologies.  However, the
foreign and Korean experts have played a major role in searching for good
sources of advanced technologies on engines.  Two Korean experts, Dr. Daeun
Lee, 50, and Dr. Hyun-soon Lee, who has prior experiences in engine
development at Chrysler and G.M, respectively, after earning his Ph.D. in
mechanical engineering in the U.S.A, have provided decisive leadership in
alpha engine development.  Mr. Clions of Ricardo engineering U.K was hired for
three years from 1985.  He has also made a great contribution in the process
of alpha engine development as a guider. Such key role persons were scouted
from foreign sources as they were in developing the Pony in the 1970s.
Hyundai hired Mr Turnbull, a former managing director of BLMC of England as
vice president for three years and six other English auto experts were also
employed to develop Pony in the mid-1970s.
Director In-soo Cho at central research institute was in charge of
developing the transmission in cooperation with alpha engine development team.
He used Nitsubishi transmission as a reference to design a new transmission
adapted to Hyundai's alpha engine.  But it was very difficult to find out
which was at fault-the transmission or alpha engine--when the transmission
broken out during the testing process because both are under development in
unapproved status.  It was learning process by trial and error to accumulate
necessary technologies.  Hyundai  has also  been active to  technological
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training   to dispatch a number of engineers to overseas training ; 83 in
1982, 141 in 1983, 166 in 1984, 276 in 1985 and 351 in 1986.
During the development process of alpha engine, there were 288
engineering changes--particularly, 156 changes in 1986 at the peak of
development.  This project costs 125 million U.S $ with 300 engines, 200
transmissions, 150 vehicles used for testing and improving performance.
On September 1985, the trial product appeared and the following multiple
test were undertaken:
   1. an emission test in Maebuk research institute in 1985;
   2. a durability test with 83 engines for 21,000 hours and vehicle test in
Phoenix, Arizona desert in July-September 1987;
   3. a summer test by Bosch Co. in Germany;
   4. a winter test at under 30-40 below zero Centigrade at Opasatika,
Ontario, Canada, January 1988;
   5. a high altitude test at Denver Colorado in July, 1989.
During the emission testing process in Maebuk institute, 11 test engines
were broken at very high to costs--25 thousands U.S $ value each.  The
development of an indigenous engine has no small meaning to Hyundai as it
enabled Hyundai to save much in royalties (90 $ royalty per one Mitsubishi
designed-engine).  Hyundai estimates that it would be able to save 43 million
U.S $ in royalty only for Scoupe production by 1995.  The reduction of royalty
for Accent production only, in 1994, is estimated 17 million $ (90 $ x
186,000).  Beside solving the royalty payment problem, the experience of
engine development in Hyundai has stimulated other makers to develop an
engine.  Kia and Daewoo have both succeeded to develop engines in the early
1990s.
The pilot car, Scoupe, equipped with alpha engine, was finally into
production in November, 1990.  Scoupe for domestic market and for export
market was also into production on April 1991 and July 1992 respectively.
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Hyundai also began to load the improved alpha engine to the newly developed
car, Accent, from April, 1994.
The success of alpha engine development enabled Hyundai to follow with
the beta engine 1,600cc, 1,800cc, and 2,000cc displacement with 16 valves DOHC
in 1995.  In the 5 years since February 1992, with 120 million U.S.$ R&D
investment, the Hyundai Beta engine--2,000cc DOHC, 152 HP, 19.5 KG/M maximum
torque--is expected to be competitive with Toyota's Corolla engine.  This
engine is designed to meet the environmental regulation of 1996 California as
recyclable plastics are widely used for weight reduction in cylinder head
cover, water pump impeller, air cleaner etc. (Korea Economic Daily, 7 March
1995).  This beta engine is now equipped with newly designed car Avante
(1995).  The central research institute established "10-year Engine
Development Plan" to develop two stroke engine, a hydrogen engine, five-gear
automatic transmission and continuous variable transmission to meet the year
2000.
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7.   CONCLUSIONS
The unique strategy of Hyundai reaching toward self-reliance might be a
major step for Hyundai in new product development, as we have discussed.  The
development of technological capability of Hyundai Motor in NPD could be
plotted as the following Table.  The capability in NDP has increased gradually
step by step as Hyundai repeated new products development since the mid-1970s.
Pony (1975), Pony-II (1982), Excel(1985), Sonata (1988), New Grandeur (1992)
and Accent (1994) were all stepping stones for Hyundai to improve its NPD
technologies.
             <Table 21>   General Technology Development
  tech.
  level
   Accent
   completely indigenous
   car
                                                    New Grandeur
                                                    joint dev.
                                                    luxurious car
                                        Sonata
                                        mid-sized car
                              Excel
                              F/F car
                     Pony-II
                     major change
      Pony
      1st. indigenous
      model
---------------------------------------------------------------------- time
1975        1982         1885       1988         1992       1994
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Hyundai has succeeded in NPD by imitative learning process of imported
technologies.  The experience of Hyundai in NPD is a great inspiration to how
auto maker in developing country can grow to be a large exporter.  We can find
very similar logic as following in the development critical products as  Pony
in 1970s,  Excel in 1980s and Alpha engine in 1990s.
     First, full and consistent support and trust of top management on the
capability of engineering staffs to encourage the dynamic technological
learning process.
Second, technology licensing from the multiple sources on the
competitive bargaining for the effective technology transfer.  The
independence in managerial control enabled Hyundai to maintain this kind of
technology licensing policy. Third, hiring of foreign experts and scouting
experts working overseas in specialized areas to supplement the technological
gap within short time.  That is logic based on the 'technology utilization'
rater than 'technology possession'
Fourth, continuous R&D investment and full delegation of authority to
engineers in technological problem solving.
But Hyundai is to meet multiple challenges in NPD.  The international
comparative bench marking shows the new product development performance of
Korean auto makers, particularly in quality, is  below the average.  How to
improve quality of new product with competitive cost from the designing stage
might be one of the most challenges to Hyundai.  Hyundai has been more
competitive in low cost small car segment but other advanced makers Ford,
G.M., Toyota, and European makers are now racing to develop low cost high
value small car with advance technologies.  Hyundai also meets the advanced
maker in domestic market as the government has lifted all of the import
regulation in 1995.  Various questions remain to Hyundai.
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First,  How to manage the heavy engineering load to extend distinctive
platform products in larger car segment with limited resource of technological
capabilities in NPD by 2000 ? But  Hyundai must get over this transition
period to be an independent auto maker in the world.
Second, How to improve the quality of new product rapidly from the
design stage.  Hyundai must consider the design for quality and design for
manufacturability instead of time compression in new product development.
Third, How to compete in cost reduction in new product development under
relatively inferior condition to increase new parts inevitably as there is
limited number of existing base platforms?
Fourth, How to manage the project management organization for the
effective NPD and how to manage multi-project management in the future?  That
is how to manage product portfolio and product integrity as  Hyundai will soon
diversify the new products.  Toyota already reformed NPD organization to
center 1,2,3,4 system to strengthen  the leadership in  mutli-project
development  it might give some policy implications to Hyundai  despite the
current  situation and contexts of Hyundai in NPD  is  different to those of
Toyota.
Fifth, How will Hyundai meet the competition in more advanced product
technologies, for example, electric vehicle, safety and smart car etc in the
future?
     This reminds us of the aforementioned  comment of Prof. Fujimoto that
efficiency at the expense of quality in new product development of Korean auto
industry in 1990s is very similar to Japanese auto industry in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.  At that time, the Japanese auto industry selected efficiency
in new product development to increase the number of new products to supply
the over-demand in domestic market but the quality of that product was not
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good. It took 20-30 years for Japanese auto industry to become world class.
The history of Japanese automobile industry  might give some  implications to
Hyundai.  The competitive strength of new product development in world
industry is shifting from japan to U.S.A  but Hyundai must pay attention what
is behind of recent dynamic process of mutual learning in new product
development in Japanese and American auto industry.
     The current project management system of Hyundai has been  relatively
light weight. The recent mild changes in R&D division to strengthen the
leadership in NPD towards the more heavy weight project management system
could  be a one of reasonable responses  to improve product quality from the
designing process but the reality  whether Hyundai is to meet the best
practice to effectively coordinate the dispersed NPD functions in the #1, #2
Passenger Car Development Institute, Central Research Institute  and Design
studio awaits  for the completion of coming new projects.  But  project
management system is one of the necessary conditions to competitive new
product development  particularly to Hyundai and Korean auto makers and  as a
consequence,  the technological capability in basic functions such as  design,
product engineering, process engineering, die manufacturing, power train and
advanced engineering might be more important in NPD.
    Overall, Hyundai has been  ahead of its Korean competitor in new product
development, it has benefited more from the first mover's advantage in new
product development but other makers are also on the rapid racing in new
product development. Hyundai is also on the world racing to be world Top 10
maker in 2000 and the effective NPD is at the heart of Hyundai's success to
get the target.
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